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LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE REFORM TREATY - 
SIMPLIFIED?
Tamara ∆apeta∗
Summary: This article deals with the new provisions devoted to EU le-
gal instruments proposed by the Constitutional Treaty and the Reform 
Treaty. In the fi rst part, the changes proposed by the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Reform Treaty are explained in relation to the present 
organisation of legal instruments. Besides describing the proposed 
changes, an attempt is made to identify the motives behind them. In 
the second part, the proposed changes are assessed as to whether 
they represent simplifi cations that would make it easier for European 
citizens to understand the EU system. The article looks at whether 
different aspects of the proposed changes, such as decreasing the 
number of legal instruments, changing their names, or introducing a 
distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts, represent sim-
plifi cations. The overall conclusion which follows is that the Reform 
Treaty does not simplify EU legal acts for EU citizens, even if there are 
certain changes which might be called simplifi cations.
Introduction
Compared to the Treaties currently in force, the Reform Treaty1 pro-
poses certain changes in the organisation of the legal acts whereby EU 
institutions decide. Proposals for introducing changes in Treaty provi-
∗  Professor of EU Law at the University of Zagreb Faculty of Law.
1  The Reform Treaty is an attempt to end the constitutional crisis in Europe created by the 
negative perception on the part of some European citizens of the idea of having a document 
called ‘the Constitution’ as the highest law governing the new polity. The green light for the 
Reform Treaty was given at the European Council that ended Germany’s presidency of the 
EU (held on 21 and 22 June 2007), at which Chancellor Merkel broke a deal on the Treaty. 
The European Council framed a relatively clear mandate for the Portuguese presidency 
regarding the acceptable content of the new Treaty to be formally submitted to the Intergov-
ernmental Conference. See IGC Mandate, published as Annex I to Council of the European 
Union, ‘Presidency Conclusions’ (Brussels, 20 June 2007) 11177/07 CONCL 2 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.
pdf> accessed 27 July 2007. The Portuguese presidency prepared a draft of the Treaty and 
submitted it to the IGC. The fi rst published version, in French, can be found at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00001.fr07.pdf> accessed 27 
July 2007. The English version of the Draft Reform Treaty has been published at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00001.en07.pdf> accessed 1 
August 2007. A consolidated version of the TEU, prepared by Steve Peers of the University 
of Essex, is now also available at: <http://www.statewatch.org/euconstitution.htm> ac-
cessed 30 July 2007.
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sions on legal acts have been on the European agenda for some time.2 
However, they have usually been hidden behind other, more vocal politi-
cal issues, such as voting in the Council. It was not, therefore, until the 
text of the Constitutional Treaty3 was adopted that any amendment to the 
Treaties in this respect was formally accepted. The Constitutional Treaty 
proposed signifi cant changes in the organisation of EU legal instruments, 
but has never seen the light of the day, since it was rejected by French 
and Dutch citizens at their referenda, and has thus never achieved legal 
signifi cance. Most of its substance was, however, transferred to the new 
project for amendments to the European Union architecture, known un-
der the name of the Reform Treaty.4 Some differences may, nevertheless, 
be identifi ed. One of them concerns the way in which legal instruments 
are to be reformed. 
The most important reason for undertaking a reorganisation of EU 
legal acts is their simplifi cation.5 Simplifi cation, however, can mean many 
things, and may serve different goals. A common defi nition of the word 
simple is ‘easily understandable to everyone’. Simplifying may, therefore, 
mean making things comprehensible to the public. Indeed, this was one 
of the meanings that Working Group IX on Simplifi cation did give to the 
2  The European Parliament proposed introducing a hierarchy of Community acts in its 
Resolution on the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union [1984] OJ C77/53. This 
issue was also raised during the IGC that led to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, when 
the European Parliament proposed a differentiation between legislative and regulatory acts 
in its Resolution on the Nature of Community Acts [1991] OJ C129/136. In 1991 similar 
proposals were also put on the table by the European Commission. These initiatives ended 
with the adoption of Declaration No 16 on the hierarchy of Community acts, annexed to 
the Maastricht Treaty, which invited the next IGC, scheduled for 1996, to ‘examine to what 
extent it might be possible to review the classifi cation of Community acts with a view to 
establishing an appropriate hierarchy between the different categories of act’. Once again, 
although the European Parliament and the Commission, as well as some Member States, 
have introduced such proposals, and this topic was also discussed by the Refl ection Group 
preparing the Conference, no proposal to amend the Treaties with regard to legal acts was 
fi nally adopted. For more see R Kovar, ‘La Déclaration No 16 annexée au Traité sur l’Union 
européenne: chronique d’un échec annoncé?’ [1997] 1-2 CDE 3; see also R Bieber and I 
Salomé, ‘Hierarchy of norms in European Law’ [1996] 33 CMLRev 907.
3  The Constitutional Treaty was offi cially entitled the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, and the version submitted to the Member States for ratifi cation was published on 
16 December 2004 (OJ C310).
4  The UK-based eurosceptic think-tank called Open Europe published an analysis accord-
ing to which 96% of the new text is the same as that of the failed Constitution <http://www.
openeurope.co.uk> accessed 26 July 2007. See also ‘Just like the constitution, say friends 
and foes of new EU treaty’ EUobserver (24 July 2007) <http://www.euobserver.com> ac-
cessed 24 July 2007. 
5  See, for instance, the Laeken Declaration attached to Council of the European Union, 
‘Presidency Conclusions’ (Laeken, 14 - 15 December 2001) SN 300/1/01 REV 1 p 22. The 
Convention working group established to propose a reorganisation of EU legal instruments 
and procedures in the Constitutional Treaty was called Working Group IX on the Simplifi ca-
tion of Legislative Procedures and Instruments. 
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term.6 Citizens’ ability to understand the EU system was seen as a pre-
condition for democracy in the EU, as citizens cannot criticise and con-
trol a system which they do not understand. 
Simplifi cation can, however, also occur by trying to explain, in as 
simple a way as possible, an otherwise complex EU reality, or it may 
mean changing this complex reality itself. In other words, simplifi cation 
can either mean making a legal text match reality, or it can mean some-
thing more than that: adjusting not only the legal text, but also the real-
ity. Both of these methods can lead to a better understanding of how the 
system functions. 
This paper aims to discuss whether the proposals of the Constitu-
tional Treaty and the Reform Treaty concerning legal acts represent sim-
plifi cations. It will also attempt to examine whether these proposals seek 
only to adjust legal texts, or actually to change the EU reality itself. As 
there are some differences between the Constitutional Treaty and the Re-
form Treaty regarding the organisation of legal acts, the paper also analy-
ses whether these differences are substantive or only nominal, and what 
the reasons for them are. The paper is divided into two parts. In the fi rst, 
changes in relation to the present situation, proposed fi rst by the Con-
stitutional Treaty and more recently by the Reform Treaty, are explained. 
In the second part, the question of whether particular elements of these 
proposed changes represent simplifi cations for EU citizens is assessed. 
The Present Situation and Proposals in the Constitutional Treaty 
and the Reform Treaty
The current Treaties
According to the Treaties currently in force, EU institutions use dif-
ferent sets of legal instruments in different pillars.7 In addition to the 15 
different legal instruments envisaged by the Treaties,8 there are other 
legal instruments which, although not contained therein, also form part 
of EU law, as determined by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the 
6  Working Group IX on Simplifi cation, ‘Final Report’ (29 November 2002) CONV 424/02 
pp 1-2.
7  Within the fi rst pillar, institutions may use regulations, directives, decisions, recommen-
dations and opinions, as defi ned in Art 249 TEC. In the second pillar (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy), institutions may set principles and general guidelines, as well as adopt 
common strategies, joint actions and common positions, as envisaged by Art 12 TEU. In 
the third pillar (Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters), institutions may is-
sue common positions, framework decisions, decisions and conventions, according to Art 
34 TEU.
8  As counted by Working Group IX on Simplifi cation (n 6) 3. See also European Convention 
(Secretariat), ‘The legal instruments: present system’ (Note) CONV 50/02, 15 May 2002. 
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ERTA case.9 These legal acts are defi ned functionally; that is, the Treaties 
defi ne legal acts only in terms of their legal effects, which, in turn, refl ect 
the function of each act within the Treaty scheme. Thus, for instance, 
a fi rst-pillar regulation is generally and directly applicable in all Mem-
ber States, refl ecting its purpose of unifying different internal norms in 
Member States by replacing them with a single Community norm. On the 
other hand, a directive binds Member States as to the regulatory result, 
but leaves them a certain freedom as to how to achieve it, thus refl ecting 
a directive’s purpose of harmonising rather than unifying law.10 
Any EU institution with law-making powers may adopt any of the 
acts enumerated in the Treaties.11 These acts are, therefore, currently 
distinct from the institution enacting them. In order to know whether 
a directive was enacted by the Council, the Council and the Parliament 
together, or the Commission, one needs to look at the directive itself. 
Likewise, legal instruments are distinct from the procedure whereby they 
may be adopted. Any of the legislative procedures provided for by the 
Treaties may result in the adoption of any of the acts envisaged therein, 
depending only on the specifi c legal basis giving the EU/EC the power 
to act in a certain fi eld.12 Implementing acts bearing the same name are 
9  Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263. In that case, the Court considered 
the proceedings of the Council to be a legally binding instrument subject to judicial review. 
The Court also considered other non-Treaty acts to be part of Community law and to have a 
legally binding force: a Commission communication in Case C-325/91 France v Commission 
[1993] ECR I-3283 para 23 and in Case C-57/95 France v Commission [1997] ECR I-1627 
para 23; a Code of Conduct enacted by the Commission in Case C-303/90 France v Com-
mission [1991] ECR I-5315 para 25; or a Resolution of the Council in Case 32/79 Commis-
sion v UK [1980] ECR 2403 para 11. Whether a non-Treaty act has a legally binding force 
is a matter of substantive analysis of the act in question. In this respect, see Case C-57/95 
France v Commission para 9.
10  Even if it is often asserted that the case law on the direct effect of directives has blurred 
the distinction between directives and regulations, it has not really changed the difference 
in purpose of these two acts. Precisely because its purpose is harmonisation, rather than 
unifi cation, only rarely will the provisions of a directive satisfy the conditions necessary for 
direct effect, primarily because they leave it to the Member States to make a substantive 
choice as to the appropriate measures for achieving the desired result. If their difference is 
blurred, therefore, it is not due to the doctrine of the direct effect of directives, but rather 
to the (incorrect) decision by EU institutions to regulate certain areas in a detailed manner 
by way of directives.
11  This is especially true of the fi rst pillar, while second-pillar acts are more closely tied to 
the enacting institution (the European Council or the Council) than fi rst-pillar acts.
12  There are certain legal bases which do not allow institutions to choose a legal instru-
ment, but rather prescribe the available legal instrument in advance. Thus Art 89 TEC 
enables the Council only to adopt regulations. Other articles require only directives, eg 
Art 47 TEC (mutual recognition of diplomas), Art 52 TEC (liberalisation of services), Art 94 
TEC (approximation of laws necessary for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market; but see Art 95 which allows a choice of acts for the same purpose), Art 96 TEC 
(elimination of distortions of competition), and Art 137 TEC (minimum requirements in 
certain issues related to social policy).
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also adopted, either by the Commission in the comitology procedure, or 
by the Council. In these cases, the Treaties do not prescribe a procedure 
for their adoption.13
Thus, at present, the legal acts envisaged by the Treaties do not re-
fl ect the division of competences between EU institutions. At the same 
time, this horizontal division of competences is not governed by any gen-
eral principle covering the entire range of EU powers; rather, the relation-
ship between institutions depends on the area of competence or policy 
involved, and is to be interpreted in light of the relevant Treaty articles in 
each case. One consequence of this is that no pre-established hierarchy 
exists among EU institutions, such that an act adopted by a ‘higher’ in-
stitution would have a higher status than one adopted by a ‘subordinate’ 
institution. This has been clearly confi rmed by the ECJ. In France, Italy 
and the UK v Commission, for example, the ECJ replied as follows to the 
UK’s arguments that directives adopted by the Commission are not of the 
same nature as those adopted by the Council:14
There is, however, no basis for that argument in the Treaty pro-
visions governing the institutions. According to Article 4, the Com-
mission is to participate in carrying out the tasks entrusted to the 
Community on the same basis as the other institutions, each acting 
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty. Arti-
cle 155 provides, in terms which are almost identical to those used 
in Article 145 to describe the same function of the Council, that 
the Commission is to have its own power of decision in the manner 
provided for in the Treaty. Moreover, the provisions of the chapter 
which lays down general rules concerning the effects and content of 
measures adopted by the institutions, in particular those of Article 
189, do not make the distinction drawn by the United Kingdom be-
tween directives which have general application and others which 
lay down only specifi c measures. According to the fi rst paragraph of 
that Article, the Commission, just as the Council, has the power to 
issue directives in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. It 
follows that the limits of the powers conferred on the Commission by 
a specifi c provision of the Treaty are to be inferred not from a general 
principle, but from an interpretation of the particular wording of the 
13  The comitology procedure was introduced by secondary law, and is today based on 
Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission [1999] OJ L184/23.
14  The UK argument was based on the implied superiority of the Council over the Commis-
sion, as the Council was given a ‘legislative’ role by the Treaties, while the Commission had 
only an executive role. See Joined Cases 188-190/80 France, Italy and the UK v Commission 
[1982] ECR 2545 para 5. 
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provision in question, in this case Article 90, analyzed in the light of 
its purpose and its place in the scheme of the Treaty.15
Thus, under the present Treaties, there is neither a hierarchy be-
tween EU institutions, nor a pre-established hierarchy between legal 
acts. This does not mean, however, that there is no hierarchy between le-
gal acts at all. Rather, it is clear that acts adopted on the basis of another 
act must comply with the enabling act.16 Whether the implementing act 
complies with the enabling act is decided based on a case-by-case inter-
pretation of the substance of each.17
The Constitutional Treaty
The Constitutional Treaty proposed signifi cant changes in the or-
ganisation of EU legal acts. The provisions on legal acts were found in its 
Part I,18 under Title V: ‘Exercise of Union Competence’. Such placement 
in the fi rst and ‘most constitutional’ part of the Treaty gives an idea of 
the great importance attributed to issues related to the organisation of 
legal acts. This is particularly true if one considers that these acts had 
previously been regulated almost sporadically in less prominent parts of 
the Treaties. The text was largely, but not entirely, the result of propos-
als by Working Group IX of the Convention preceding the 2004 IGC, ie 
the working group charged with the task of simplifying EU legal acts. 
15  Joined Cases 188-190/80 France, Italy and the UK v Commission (n 14) para 6. Art 145 
is now Art 202 TEC; Art 155 is Art 211 TEC; Art 189 is Art 249 TEC; and Art 90 is Art 86 
TEC. See also Case C-163/99 Portugal v Commission [2001] ECR I-2613 paras 21 and 23. 
16  It is not clear, however, whether the validity of an act that implements another, basic act 
can be affected by its incompatibility with some other act adopted directly pursuant to the 
Treaty. For a short overview of different positions, see R Schütze, ‘Sharpening the Separa-
tion of Powers through a Hierarchy of Norms?’ (2005) EIPA Working Paper 2005/W/01 p 
8. Some authors consider the hierarchy between basic and implementing acts to be merely 
relative; see J Bast, ‘On the Grammar of EU Law: Legal Instruments’ (2003) Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 9 p 25 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901-05.pdf> accessed 24 July 2007. 
Others argue that such ‘tertiary law’ should conform to the entire ‘secondary law’, ie those 
norms adopted directly pursuant to the Treaty; see K Lenaerts and A Verhoven, ‘Towards 
a legal framework for executive rule-making in the EU? The contribution of the Comitology 
Decision’ [2000] 37 CMLRev 645, 652. 
17  For example, Case 25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Köster 
et Berodt & Co [1970] ECR 1161 and Case 230/78 SpA Eridania-Zuccherifi ci nazionali and 
SpA Società Italiana per l‘Industria degli Zuccheri v Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Minister for Industry, Trade and Craft Trades and SpA Zuccherifi ci Meridionali [1979] ECR 
2749.
18  The Constitutional Treaty was organised in four parts, Part I containing the most impor-
tant provisions for the EU’s organisation and functioning, Part II the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, and Part III other provisions of the TEU and TEC as amended, while Part IV 
contained some fi nal provisions common to all the other parts. 
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Altogether seven articles19 were inserted into Part I of the Constitutional 
Treaty in order to explain EU legal instruments. 
The new system contained several novelties. Firstly, the acts were 
renamed so that, instead of ‘regulation’ and ‘directive’, the Constitutional 
Treaty introduced the terms ‘law’ and ‘framework law’. However, in terms 
of the legal effects of these acts, the defi nition still corresponded to the 
familiar division between regulations and directives.20 Thus a law was de-
fi ned as an act of general application, binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States, while a framework law was defi ned as 
an act binding upon each Member State to which it is addressed as to the 
result to be achieved, but leaving it to the national authorities to choose 
the form and methods of achieving it. The term ‘regulation’ still fi gured 
among the acts, but was differently defi ned. Under the Constitutional 
Treaty, a regulation could have the same effects as either a regulation or 
a directive under the present EC Treaty. Finally, the term ‘decision’ was 
also retained, but with a broader defi nition as to its legal effects than that 
of a current fi rst-pillar decision. A decision was thus defi ned as binding 
in its entirety and, where its addressees are specifi ed, as binding only on 
them. The adjective ‘European’ was attached to all four types of legally 
binding acts: European law, European framework law, European regula-
tion, and European decision.21
Secondly, the number of acts available to EU institutions was re-
duced. Since the Constitutional Treaty eliminated the division of EU pow-
ers into three pillars, although the CFSP remained an intergovernmental 
power, the same legal acts were to be used for all powers of the EU. Thus 
the overall number of acts available under the Constitutional Treaty de-
creased,22 while at the same time the difference between types of powers 
was not refl ected in these acts. 
Finally, the Constitutional Treaty introduced a division into legisla-
tive and non-legislative acts, and further divided non-legislative acts into 
delegated and implementing acts, thus implicitly introducing a hierarchy 
among these acts. Legislative acts were defi ned as those adopted on the 
basis of legislative procedures. While the Constitutional Treaty proposed 
that co-decision become the regular legislative procedure, many other 
procedures were retained and deemed legislative. These procedures, 
19  Art I-33 to I-39 of the Constitutional Treaty.
20  In this respect, see S Prechal, ‘Adieu à la Directive?’ [2005] 1 European Constitutional 
Law Review 481.
21  Art I-33 of the Constitutional Treaty.
22  The Constitutional Treaty did not eliminate the possibility for institutions to use other, 
extra-constitutional acts, although it tried to discourage such practices. See Art I-33 para 
2 of the Constitutional Treaty. 
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which the Constitutional Treaty called ‘special legislative procedures’,23 
were those whereby either the European Parliament alone24 or the Coun-
cil alone25 adopted legal acts, with some type of participation by the other 
institution. In the case of regular legislative procedure, the initiator of the 
legislative act to be adopted was exclusively the European Commission. 
However, since many special legislative procedures remained intact, the 
Commission did not enjoy an exclusive power to propose legislative acts, 
but rather shared that power with the Member States, the European Par-
liament, the European Central Bank, or even the European Court of Jus-
tice and the European Investment Bank.26 Thus acts adopted under the 
ex co-decision procedure or other different legislative procedures were 
legislative acts. In this way, the adoption of legislative acts was reserved 
to the European Parliament and the Council. The European Commission, 
or indeed other EU bodies, could not enact legislative acts. 
The Constitutional Treaty opted for a formal defi nition of a legislative 
act, coupling this notion only with a certain type of procedure and, conse-
quently, with certain institutions able to enact it. Thus it did not follow the 
proposal by the Working Group on Simplifi cation, which offered a more 
substantive understanding of legislative acts, ie acts adopted pursuant to 
the Treaty and containing the essential elements in a given fi eld.27 Some 
connection to this substantive criterion was, however, maintained in the 
article dealing with delegated acts, which prohibited delegation of these 
essential elements and reserved them for legislative acts.28 
23  Art I-34 para 2 of the Constitutional Treaty.
24  Art III-330 of the Constitutional Treaty gives Parliament the right to adopt a European 
law regulating its members’ performance of their duties. Such a law would require the con-
sent of the Council. Under Art III-333 of the Constitutional Treaty, Parliament was to adopt 
a European law regulating exercise of the right of inquiry. Such a law would enter into 
force upon the consent of both the Council and the Commission. Under Art III-335 of the 
Constitutional Treaty, Parliament was given the power to regulate the offi ce of the European 
Ombudsman, having obtained the Commission’s opinion and the Council’s consent.
25  According to the Constitutional Treaty, the Council may, upon consultation with the 
European Parliament, unanimously adopt the following: a European law or framework law 
to regulate the exercise of voting rights in municipal and European elections for non-nation-
als in their country of residence (Art III-126); a law or framework law to harmonise indi-
rect taxation (Art III-171); a European law regulating language arrangements for European 
intellectual property rights (Art III-176); decisions on certain issues of social policy (Art 
III-210(3)); and, in the fi eld of judicial and police cooperation, a European law establishing 
European Public Prosecutor’s Offi ce (Art III-274), a European law or framework law regulat-
ing operational cooperation between police authorities (Art III-275(3)), and, fi nally, a law or 
framework law setting the conditions under which the judicial and police authorities of one 
Member State may operate in the territory of another (Art III-277). 
26  Art I-34 para 3. See also Art I-26 para 2 of the Constitutional Treaty.
27  Working Group IX on Simplifi cation (n 6) 9.
28  Art I-36 of the Constitutional Treaty.
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The division into legislative and non-legislative acts was accompanied 
by new names for them. Thus legislative acts were called European laws 
and European framework laws, while binding non-legislative acts were 
called European regulations and European decisions. Once the names of 
the legal acts had been modifi ed, they needed to be changed for each spe-
cifi c legal basis throughout the Constitutional Treaty. Thus it was neces-
sary to revise the legal bases authorising institutions to act in Part III of 
the Constitutional Treaty. At the same time, it was also decided whether an 
act adopted by the Parliament alone or the Council alone was legislative or 
non-legislative, and names were given to such acts accordingly. According 
to many commentators, the way in which this was done was far from satis-
factory, as it was not clear by which criteria these decisions were made.29 
One criterion proposed by Working Group IX for deciding which acts 
based directly on the Treaty were non-legislative was that such acts only 
elaborate in detail the policy choices in a particular area that are already 
expressed in the Treaty.30 However, this does not help us in understand-
ing certain choices. For example, the legal basis allowing the Council to 
enlarge the list of state subsidies deemed compatible with the internal 
market was classifi ed by the Constitutional Treaty as non-legislative. The 
Council was to specify categories of aid additional to those already enu-
merated in the Constitutional Treaty by means of European regulations 
or decisions.31 Yet how can a decision by the Council adding another 
category of state aid which is deemed permissible under the Treaty be 
classifi ed as merely a development of existing policy choices, when in 
fact it represents a change in the policy choice contained in the Treaty, 
adding a new category to a closed list? Or how can the decisions which 
the Council may enact in the fi eld of competition law - for example, to 
defi ne the ‘respective functions of the Commission and of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union’ in applying rules on competition - be 
deemed non-essential? And yet the Constitutional Treaty envisaged that 
the Council would adopt non-legislative European regulations for this 
purpose.32 There are still other examples, which have been discussed 
elsewhere.33 Suffi ce it to say here that the criteria for choosing whether 
a decision would be legislative or non-legislative cannot be deduced from 
the choices that were actually made. This makes it diffi cult to understand 
29  For an excellent analysis, see Jonas Bering Liisberg, ‘The EU Constitutional Treaty and 
Its Distinction between Legislative and Non-Legislative Acts - Oranges into Apples?’ (2006) 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 1. See also M Dougan, ‘The Convention’s Draft Constitutional 
Treaty: Bringing Europe closer to its lawyers?’ [2003] EL Rev 763, 783-784; K Lenaerts, ‘A 
Unifi ed Set of Instruments’ [2005] 1 EuConst 57, 61.
30  Working Group IX on Simplifi cation (n 6) 13.
31  Art III-167(3)e of the Constitutional Treaty.
32  Art III-163 of the Constitutional Treaty.
33  Jonas Bering Liisberg (n 29) 31-44.
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the newly proposed division into legislative and non-legislative acts. Fi-
nally, as legislative acts may be adopted only by the Council and/or the 
European Parliament, acts adopted by the Commission directly pursuant 
to the Treaty were necessarily classifi ed as non-legislative, even if they 
sometimes involve diffi cult policy choices.34
Besides the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts, 
the Constitutional Treaty distinguishes between different types of non-
legislative acts, based on the distinction between delegation and imple-
mentation. However, the Constitutional Treaty does not really explain 
where the difference between the two lies. Article I-36, which deals with 
delegation, states that legislative acts may delegate power to the Com-
mission to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a law 
or framework law. Article I-37, dealing with implementation, does not try 
in the same manner to explain what implementation is, but rather speci-
fi es to whom implementing powers may be given (the Commission or the 
Council) and why (if uniform implementing conditions are needed). Im-
plementing powers can, it seems, be given to EU institutions by all legally 
binding EU acts, and thus not necessarily only by legislative acts. 
Implementation obviously does not only mean the application of legal 
rules to individual situations, as it may be performed by European regula-
tions, which are acts of general application. Therefore, it also implies the 
adoption of generally applicable rules, which necessarily do, in some way, 
supplement a basic enabling act. The possibility of supplementing a basic 
act thus cannot be what constitutes the difference between delegation and 
implementation, for both may serve to fl esh out a basic act. The only sub-
stantive difference between delegation and implementation which can be 
read from the text of the Constitutional Treaty is that the Commission may 
amend certain ‘non-essential’ parts of a basic act only when exercising del-
egated powers, while it may not do so under implementing powers. 
The difference, and an important one, lies in the procedure giving a 
different power of control over the Commission to the enabling institu-
tions, depending on whether it is performing a delegated role or imple-
menting EU rules. In its implementing role, the Commission would con-
tinue to be subject to the comitology procedure.35 When, on the contrary, 
34  As in Art III-166(3) of the Constitutional Treaty, relating to public undertakings and 
undertakings to which states grant special or exclusive rights.
35  In fact, Art I-37 of the Constitutional Treaty does not say this. Rather, it envisages that 
the control mechanism for the Commission‘s implementing powers will be enacted by a 
European law, ie by a joint decision of the European Parliament and the Council. This gives 
new powers to the European Parliament in organising control over the Commission’s imple-
menting role. In theory, the control mechanism introduced by the Comitology Decision (n 
13) need not be retained, or may be signifi cantly modifi ed. The two institutions might, on a 
proposal by the Commission, decide on new forms of control, including those envisaged for 
control of the Commission’s delegated role. 
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the Commission enacts legal provisions based on delegation, the Consti-
tutional Treaty envisages a different type of control, eg the possibility for 
the Parliament or the Council to revoke delegated powers, or the option of 
conditioning the entry into force of a delegated regulation on the consent 
of the European Parliament and the Council, which would be deemed 
granted if no objection were raised within a certain period of time.36 Thus 
control over the Commission’s delegated powers pertains to the time fol-
lowing the adoption of a delegated act, whereas control over implement-
ing powers relates to the time before, or better stated, during adoption of 
an implementing act. Prior control over delegated acts might be exercised 
to a certain extent by the delegating institution(s) in defi ning the ‘objec-
tives, content, scope and duration of delegated power’.37
Although the Constitutional Treaty did not connect non-legislative 
acts with any procedure, its Article I-35 enumerated the institutions em-
powered to adopt non-legislative acts: the European Council, the Coun-
cil, the Commission and the European Central Bank. Not all of these 
institutions could adopt any type of non-legislative act. Thus the Euro-
pean Council could only adopt European decisions, while the other three 
institutions might adopt both European decisions and European regula-
tions. However, as the Constitutional Treaty introduced the additional 
distinction between delegation and implementation, both of which are 
performed by means of non-legislative acts, it is necessary to read other 
articles in order to understand which institutions could adopt which type 
of act. Since the power to regulate could be ‘delegated’ only on the Eu-
ropean Commission, and delegated powers only exercised on the basis 
of European regulations (not decisions),38 it may be concluded that only 
the Commission could be enabled to adopt delegated European regula-
tions. On the other hand, while implementation is usually done by the 
Member States,39 it could, under certain conditions, be entrusted to the 
EU level, in which case it would be performed, as a rule, by the European 
Commission, but also by the Council in duly justifi ed specifi c cases.40 Im-
plementing acts could take the form either of a European regulation or a 
European decision.41 Thus implementing European regulations and deci-
sions could be adopted by either the Commission or the Council, as well 
as by the European Central Bank, which, according to the Constitutional 
36  Art I-36(2) of the Constitutional Treaty.
37  As envisaged in the second sentence of Art I-36 para 1 of the Constitutional Treaty.
38  Art I-36 para 1 of the Constitutional Treaty.
39  Art I-37 para 1 of the Constitutional Treaty.
40  Art I-37 para 2 of the Constitutional Treaty. The precondition for implementation at the 
European rather than Member State level is that ‘uniform conditions for implementing le-
gally binding Union acts are needed’.
41  Art I-37 para 4 of the Constitutional Treaty.
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Treaty, could enact European regulations and decisions ‘in the specifi c 
cases provided for in the Constitution’.42 
The Reform Treaty
Unlike the Constitutional Treaty, which was supposed to replace the 
old text of the Treaties - the TEU and TEC - with a completely new one, 
the Reform Treaty sticks to the old method of changing the Treaties, ie 
introducing amendments to the latest version of their text. Once the con-
solidated texts are produced, the Reform Treaty will result in two treaties: 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (ToFEU), which is the new name for the EC Trea-
ty, as amended. The TEU will contain common provisions for the entire 
EU, plus provisions regulating the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
The ToFEU will contain provisions relating to other EU policies, including 
issues which previously belonged to the third pillar, eg police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.43 EU institutions will be enumerated and 
their basic functions within the EU system explained in the TEU, while 
more detailed provisions on their functioning will be found in the ToFEU. 
The latter will also contain provisions relating to legislative procedures 
and legal acts to be adopted by EU institutions.
The Reform Treaty thus places provisions dealing with legal acts in 
the ToFEU, there where Article 249 TEC is currently located, amending 
the Article itself and inserting several new articles after it. Even though 
the two new treaties have the same legal force,44 the TEU is still more gen-
eral, setting forth the most important features of the EU in its fi rst part. 
At fi rst glance, therefore, one may conclude that the issue of legal acts 
has been given less importance in this reform, compared with the Con-
stitutional Treaty project. The legal acts that EU institutions may adopt 
are not even enumerated in the amended TEU, although this would have 
been possible even within the limits imposed by this method of chang-
ing the Treaties.45 One additional constraint, however, was the mandate 
given by the Brussels European Council of 21 and 22 June 2007.46
42  Art I-35 para 2 of the Constitutional Treaty.
43  Thus one may say that the Reform Treaty has created a two-pillar EU in place of a three-
pillar one.
44  Cf the new Art 1 para 2 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty.
45  Thus, for example, the basic defi nitions of each institution, including its composition 
and its functions within the Treaty scheme, have been moved from the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the EU to the Treaty on European Union. See the newly proposed Title III TEU.
46  The part relevant to the restructuring of legal acts reads as follows: 
u) In Article 249 (defi nition of EU acts: regulation, directive and decision), in a new Section 
1 on the Union‘s legal acts, the defi nition of a decision will be aligned with the one agreed 
in the 2004 IGC.
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The second important difference compared to the Constitutional 
Treaty is the Reform Treaty’s retention of the old names for legal acts. 
Thus, even if for the wrong reasons,47 the terms ‘regulation’, ‘directive’ 
and ‘decision’ have survived the amendments. This is fortunate, in my 
opinion, as I will explain later. The defi nition of a decision has been en-
larged, in the same way as in the Constitutional Treaty, so that it may be 
adopted either with or without specifi c addressees.48 
The differentiation between legislative, delegated and implement-
ing acts introduced by the Constitutional Treaty is retained.49 As in that 
Treaty, legislative acts have been defi ned here formally, as acts adopted 
in the legislative procedure.50 Legislative procedures resulting in a legisla-
tive act can, again, be ordinary (ex co-decision) or special (the Council or 
the Parliament deciding alone, with some participation by the other insti-
tution).51 Also as in the Constitutional Treaty, the provision dealing with 
delegated acts52 reserves the essential elements of an area of competence 
to legislative acts, thus introducing substantive elements into the under-
standing of this term. The substantive difference between delegation and 
implementation is not explained in the Reform Treaty, either, and the 
only visible difference seems to be a procedural one regarding the type of 
control over the Commission’s delegated or implementing role.
v) As a consequence of dropping the denominations ‘law’ and ‘framework law’, the innova-
tions agreed in the 2004 IGC will be adapted, while maintaining the distinction between 
what is legislative and what is not and its consequences. Accordingly, after Article 249, 
three Articles will be introduced on, respectively, acts which are adopted in accordance 
with a legislative procedure, delegated acts and implementing acts. The Article on legisla-
tive acts will state that acts (regulations, directives or decisions) adopted under a legislative 
procedure (ordinary or special) will be legislative acts. The terminology in the Articles on 
delegated and implementing acts, as agreed in the 2004 IGC, will be adapted accordingly.
See the IGC Mandate published as part of the Brussels Council Presidency Conclusions (n 
1) 22.
47  It seems that the main reason for dropping the names accepted in the Constitutional 
Treaty was the insistence of some Member States, led by the UK, that any possible link with 
statehood be removed from the text of the Treaties. Thus, together with the provisions on 
European symbols, such as the anthem and fl ag, or changing the name of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to High Representative, the names ‘European law’ and ‘European framework 
law’ were also dropped.
48  See amended Art 249 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty.
49  However, unlike the Constitutional Treaty, there are no titles here for the articles group-
ing acts as either legislative or non-legislative. There is also no separate article dealing with 
non-legislative acts together as a group, as proposed by the Constitutional Treaty in its Art 
I-35. One possible explanation for this is that the names of the acts have not been changed, 
and do not differ depending on whether the act is legislative or not. On the other hand, there 
might also be a wish to leave clarifi cation of the meaning of legislative and non-legislative 
acts and the purpose of such a division to developments in practice.
50  See the new Art 249A para 3 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty.
51  See the new Article 249A para 1 and 2 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty. 
52  See the new Article 249B ToFEU, as proposed by Article 2 - 239) of the Reform Treaty.
170 Tamara ∆apeta: Legal Instruments in the Reform Treaty - Simplifi ed?
The third difference between the Reform Treaty and the Constitu-
tional Treaty is that any of the legally binding EU acts - regulations, di-
rectives or decisions - can be adopted as a legislative act. Thus a decision, 
which could be adopted only as an implementing act under the Constitu-
tional Treaty, returns among the possible legislative acts in the new Trea-
ty. All three types of legally binding acts can also be adopted as delegated 
or implementing acts. However, they must be named accordingly: for ex-
ample, a delegated regulation, or an implementing directive.53 Thus it will 
be possible to know simply by reading the title of a given act whether it is 
a legislative act or non-legislative one, and whether it was adopted based 
on delegated or implementing powers, without having to make recourse 
to the text of either the act itself or the basic enabling act.
As the legislative/non-legislative division is not accompanied by dif-
ferentiated names of legal acts, as was the case in the Constitutional 
Treaty, it has not been necessary to revise each specifi c legal basis in the 
ToFEU and decide whether an act which the Council or the Parliament 
is entitled to adopt on its own should be characterised as legislative or 
non-legislative. In this way, the often unsatisfactory choices made by the 
Constitutional Treaty54 have been avoided. It remains unclear whether 
certain acts adopted by the Council or the Parliament directly pursuant 
to the ToFEU are legislative or not.55 
Finally, the fourth difference lies in how issues of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are dealt with. The Reform Treaty 
handles acts under the CFSP and under other competences separately. 
While the provisions regulating legal acts which I have just described 
do not mention the CFSP area at all,56 or indeed the European Council 
as a possible enactor of legal acts, the part of the Constitutional Treaty 
dealing with legal acts was clearly relevant to all EU policies, including 
the CFSP. Thus the Constitutional Treaty envisaged that the European 
53  This also clarifi es something which was not completely clear in the Constitutional Trea-
ty, namely, that the adjective ‘delegated’ or ‘implementing’ must be given in the title of 
the act. The Constitutional Treaty did contain these adjectives in the titles of the relevant 
articles (Delegated European Regulations and Implementing Acts in Articles I-36 and I-37, 
respectively), but did not state that these adjectives must be used in the names of the acts 
adopted. Since regulations could thus have been used for both delegated powers and pur-
poses of implementation, the difference between the two could not be understood merely on 
the basis of the title of the act, but rather only after examining the enabling act.
54  See the explanation and examples given in nn 29-34 above. 
55  While the Reform Treaty has inserted the words ‘according to special legislative proce-
dure’ in many articles, in some cases it remains unanswered whether the act to be adopted 
is legislative or not; see, for example, Article 83 or Article 87/3(e). Acts adopted under these 
articles were designated by the Constitutional Treaty as non-legislative. 
56  Except for Art 249c ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty, which states that imple-
menting powers may be conferred on the Council ‘in cases in Article I-40’, thus referring to 
the article of the Constitutional Treaty that dealt with the CFSP.
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Council could adopt European decisions, ie acts that were categorised as 
non-legislative. The Reform Treaty deals with the entire CFSP area in a 
separate treaty, the TEU (more precisely, Chapter 2 thereof). This chapter 
mentions decisions as acts to be adopted in the CFSP area:
The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy 
by: 
[…] 
(b) adopting decisions defi ning: 
(i)  actions to be undertaken by the Union; 
(ii)  positions to be taken by the Union; 
(iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred 
to in points (i) and (ii)57 
However, it is not clear whether the term ‘decision’ in the CFSP area 
has the same meaning as a decision pursuant to Article 249 ToFEU, or 
is instead just a general expression for the outcome of a decision-mak-
ing process. The new Article 17 TEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty, 
expressly excludes the possibility of using legislative acts in the CFSP 
area. However, it remains a question what this exclusion of legislative 
acts really means, since legislative acts are defi ned in a formal way by 
reference to their procedure of adoption. As CFSP decisions are clearly 
not adopted through any of the procedures deemed legislative (either or-
dinary or special), this exclusion seems superfl uous. However, if the term 
‘legislative act’ is understood in a substantive sense, ie as an act wherein 
basic policy choices are made, this could considerably limit EU action in 
the CFSP area. Leaving the CFSP out of the new schema of EU legal acts 
is, therefore, probably a better reading of the Reform Treaty.
Simplifi ed?
The new articles of both the Constitutional Treaty and the Reform 
Treaty obviously do contain some novelties with regard to how legal acts 
are organised in the text of the present Treaties. Does the system that 
the Member States wished to introduce under the Constitutional Treaty, 
and are now trying to introduce under the Reform Treaty, represent a 
simplifi cation? Does it merely state in a simpler way, ie the way most 
understandable to EU citizens, the reality of EU decision-making and its 
outcomes? Or is the new organisation of legal acts the result of a new 
organisation of EU decision-making? If the latter, then this could mean 
that the relationship between EU institutions and the ways in which de-
cision-making is legitimised have changed. The IGC can, of course, pro-
57  See the new Article 12 TEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty. 
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pose substantive, important changes; and indeed such changes can only 
happen based on Treaty amendments. Thus the second explanation of 
what is being offered by the Reform Treaty may also be possible. Yet if 
these changes are substantive, do they simplify the EU for European citi-
zens? In the remainder of this paper, I will examine these questions with 
regard to the different types of proposed changes.
Reducing the number of acts and redefi ning decisions
Of the different changes that are or were on the table, the reduc-
tion of the number of acts seems to be one that would inevitably lead to 
a more understandable system. And indeed, I believe that simplifi cation 
will result from this. However, not all the ways of reducing the number of 
acts necessarily represent simplifi cations. 
Reducing the number of acts by merging acts of the same kind un-
der a common name is simplifi cation. One example of this is merging 
both a fi rst-pillar directive58 and a third-pillar framework decision under 
the term ‘directive’.59 Also, reducing the number of acts by eliminating 
some currently existing types that have not been widely used in practice 
likewise constitutes simplifi cation. An example of this is the elimination 
of third-pillar conventions,60 which have disappeared not only in name 
but even as a type of act available to EU institutions. Finally, expanding 
the defi nition of an act to cover what has developed under that name in 
practice also involves simplifi cation. The enlarged defi nition of a decision, 
which takes into account the development of non-Treaty acts called deci-
sions yet not matching the defi nition of a decision under the EC Treaty, 
is an example of such simplifi cation. Such reductions were, however, a 
logical consequence either of developments in practice or political deci-
sions made in relation to other issues by the 2004 IGC or the Brussels 
European Council of June 2007. Thus the unifi cation of fi rst-pillar and 
third-pillar acts and the elimination of acts of an intergovernmental na-
ture was possible because a political decision to submit third-pillar is-
sues to the Community method had been reached. This reduction of the 
number of acts is, therefore, partly the result of textual adjustments to 
reality, but also of important decisions altering the balance of powers in 
the EU in today’s third-pillar area. 
On the contrary, reducing the number of acts by giving acts of dif-
ferent kinds the same name does not represent simplifi cation. Such a 
move does not lead to a better understanding of the system; rather, it is 
misleading. Here I am referring to the CFSP area. The solution proposed 
58  Currently Art 249 TEC.
59  Currently Art 34 TEU.
60  Currently Art 34 TEU.
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by the Constitutional Treaty was clearly to use decisions, defi ned as non-
legislative implementing acts, as the only instrument for the CFSP. Re-
ducing the common actions and common positions available under the 
CFSP61 to just one instrument, especially one defi ned as broadly as deci-
sions were defi ned in the Constitutional Treaty, is indeed simplifi cation. 
However, using the same instrument for competences that are of a differ-
ent nature, and thus regulated by different methods, is not. Using deci-
sions as the sole legal instrument in the CFSP area, and as implementing 
acts in other fi elds, is more confusing than clarifying. Giving the same 
name to things that are different is not simplifi cation. 
The Reform Treaty solution is possibly better in terms of simplify-
ing decision-making and legal acts in the CFSP area. But only ‘possibly’, 
because, as explained earlier, it is not clear how the Reform Treaty is to 
be read when it comes to the appropriate legal instruments in the CFSP 
area.62 However, it seems possible to interpret the proposed amendments 
related to legal instruments in the ToFEU as not being relevant to the 
CFSP. This allows for a decision as per the new Article 12 TEU63 to be 
understood as an act additional to those enumerated in Article 249 To-
FEU. For the sake of clarity, it would be better if decisions taken in the 
CFSP area were to have an attribute linking them to this area of EU com-
petence, eg ‘CFSP decision’. If, however, the new Article 249 ToFEU is 
not applicable to the CFSP area, then the decision mentioned in the new 
Article 12 TEU remains undefi ned except for its possible purposes, eg de-
fi ning Union actions and positions, basic decisions, and implementation 
of such basic decisions. On whom and how such decisions are binding is 
not answered by the Treaty. Yet even if it needs further elaboration, the 
solution offered by the Reform Treaty concerning acts in the CFSP area 
seems better in terms of simplifi cation, compared to what was offered by 
the Constitutional Treaty. 
Some additional confusion may result from the new defi nition of a 
decision.64 It is obvious from the chosen defi nition that the intention was 
to retain one broadly defi ned and, therefore, fl exible instrument which 
could be used to enact general decisions, and which would make recourse 
to non-Treaty instruments unnecessary. The fi rst part of this defi nition 
thus states that it is an act binding in its entirety. It is also clear that a 
decision is also meant to be an act for individual decision-making. This 
61  Currently Art 14 and 15 TEU, respectively.
62  See above following n 57 in the main text.
63  See n 57.
64  The new defi nition is the same in both the Constitutional Treaty and the Reform Treaty, 
with the signifi cant difference, however, that in the Reform Treaty a decision may be used 
as both an implementing and a delegated act, while in the Constitutional Treaty it could 
only be used as an implementing act. 
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is probably why the second part of the defi nition was added, specifying 
that a decision which specifi es its addressees is binding only on those to 
whom it is addressed. Thus a decision without addressees is binding in 
its entirety on anyone, while a decision specifying addressees is binding 
in its entirety only on them. I fail to see the difference between a general 
decision and a regulation, except perhaps that the defi nition of a regula-
tion presumes that it must be applied in the Member States (for it is writ-
ten that it is directly applicable in all the Member States), thus making it 
inappropriate for deciding on internal institutional or inter-institutional 
matters of organisation. In that case, a comitology decision, for example 
(as envisaged in Art 249C para 3 ToFEU), would be more properly enact-
ed in the form of a decision than a regulation. I also fail to see the reason 
for stating that a decision with addressees binds them in its entirety. This 
is obviously not meant to stress that the addressees are bound by deci-
sions addressed to them, as that goes without saying. Also, the fact that a 
decision only binds its addressees cannot in itself exclude possible effects 
on third parties. Thus the reason for adding this sentence might be to 
avoid confusion between a decision addressed to the Member States and 
a directive, which is also, by defi nition, addressed to the Member States, 
yet binds them only as to the result to be achieved. This, however, is once 
again misleading, as a directive also binds, ie creates obligations for, the 
Member States in its entirety, as clarifi ed by ECJ case law on the direct 
effect of directives. In conclusion, it would be much simpler if the authors 
of the Reform Treaty clearly stated that a decision is a binding act which 
may or may not specify its addressees, and which may be used as either 
a general or an individual legal act.
Names of acts
As explained in the previous section, the names of legal instruments 
were changed under the Constitutional Treaty, but have not been changed 
in the Reform Treaty. I have also already stated that I welcome the Re-
form Treaty’s solution, and will now try to explain why (for the reason is 
not pure nostalgia). The real reason why the terms ‘law’ and ‘framework 
law’ have been excluded is explained in the IGC mandate:
The TEU and Treaty on the Functioning of the Union will not have a 
constitutional character. The terminology used throughout the trea-
ties will refl ect this change: (…) the denominations ‘law’ and ‘frame-
work law’ will be abandoned, the existing denominations ‘regula-
tions’, ‘directives’ and ‘decisions’ being retained.65 
65  IGC Mandate (n 1) point 3, 16.
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Thus these names were dropped for exactly the opposite reason than 
explaining things clearly to EU citizens: they are part of a plan to per-
suade citizens that the EU does not have a constitution, even if it does 
have one. And all this for the sake of the new Treaty’s success, which is 
obviously conditioned by citizens not having a say on it. Perverse, yet 
pragmatic. 
However, the reason why I think that dropping the terms ‘law’ and 
‘framework law’ is good is a different one: because they were misleading. 
In most Member States, the term ‘law’ is connected with an institution 
that is empowered to issue laws, that being exclusively a parliament. In 
the EU, the European Parliament does indeed participate in the creation 
of what is called European law, yet it shares this power with the Council. 
Furthermore, in the Member States the term ‘law’ not only points to a 
parliament but to the source of its legitimacy, ie the citizens who elect a 
parliament. What legitimises EU ‘laws’ is not only the citizens behind the 
Parliament, but also the Member States behind the Council. Sometimes 
it even seems, at least for the citizens of some Member States, that le-
gitimacy deriving from the Council is more important than that deriving 
from the Parliament. The EU is acceptable today only if it satisfi es such 
a demand for double legitimacy. However, as the term ‘law’ is linked with 
only one source of legitimacy, namely, the citizens represented in parlia-
ments, using this term in an EU context is more misleading than clari-
fying. The term is even more misleading if one remembers that, due to 
still numerous exceptions,66 a law may be adopted by the Council alone, 
without the Parliament. On the other hand, there will most likely be fewer 
and fewer of these exceptions as integration evolves. 
The concept of a framework law, in its meaning under the Constitu-
tional Treaty, is even less familiar to European citizens. Such an act tells 
national parliaments what they ought to do. In the usual understanding 
of things, a parliament cannot be ordered to do anything by a law coming 
from anywhere but the parliament itself.67 European citizens are familiar 
with the concept of vague legislation that requires supplementation by 
another body - usually the government. In many Member States, parlia-
mentary laws are so vague as to leave a lot to the government; however, 
this is the EU concept of delegation/implementation, not of a framework 
law. Thus the term ‘framework law’ is far from clear with regard to ex-
plaining its basic meaning to European citizens. 
On the other hand, the EC/EU has existed for more than 50 years, 
and thus several generations of citizens have lived with it. Why should 
66  See n 91.
67  This does not mean that the actions of Parliament cannot be limited at all. Such limita-
tions usually proceed from the constitutional norms of the polity.
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they not be familiar with names coming from Brussels like ‘regulation’ or 
‘directive’, and be able to connect them with a real effect on their every-
day lives? Many individuals have relied, or at least tried to rely, on such 
acts to enforce their rights in court. One need only remember the Vari-
ola brothers,68 Ms Marshall,69 Ms Faccini Dori,70 Ms Von Colson and Ms 
Kamman,71 Mr Francovich,72 and so on.73 That the names ‘regulation’ and 
‘directive’ are commonly known is possibly even truer in the new Member 
States. Much time and money was spent on teaching different actors in 
the new Member States what directives are, for example, and explaining 
their effects. Not only public servants and judges were involved in this, 
but many others, such as translators or journalists. In Croatia, months 
were spent just on fi nding the appropriate translation for the term ‘direc-
tive’.74 Newspapers use these terms, as do politicians whenever they try 
to impress the public with the uncountable numbers of directives which 
have to be transposed in order to adjust to the acquis communautaire 
(people may even have learned the expression ‘acquis communautaire’!). 
It was wrong, therefore, to presume that citizens need names familiar to 
them from their domestic legal systems in order to understand, and that 
they are completely unfamiliar with the existing EU names.
One additional advantage of keeping the old names is to avoid the 
possible confusion which would result from regulations under the Con-
stitutional Treaty. While regulations have always been perceived as the 
most law-like of EC acts, the Constitutional Treaty suddenly ‘degraded’ 
them into subordinate acts. More importantly, while regulations hitherto 
have been acts binding in their entirety and directly applicable in the 
Member States, the Constitutional Treaty opened the possibility for them 
also to be acts binding the Member States only as to the regulatory result, 
leaving them the choice of how to achieve such a result, and thus neces-
sitating transposition. Finally, the Constitutional Treaty did not provide 
68  Case 34/73 Fratelli Variola v Ministry of Finance [1973] ECR 981.
69  Case 152/84 M.H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Au-
thority [1986] ECR 723.
70  Case C-91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl [1994] ECR I-3325.
71  Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamman v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
[1984] ECR 1891.
72  Joined Cases C-6 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and Others v Ital-
ian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357.
73  For a different view, see HCH Hofmann, ‘A Critical Analysis of the New Typology of Acts 
in the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (2003) 7(9) EIoP 3 <http://eiop.
or.at/eiop/texte/2003-009a.htm> accessed 24 July 2007. Hofmann considers that the 
names of EU legal acts, chosen to express the Union’s non-state nature, give the impression 
that Europe is a matter for elites only, and therefore excludes its citizens from European 
affairs..
74  After all these discussions, a directive is called direktiva in Croatian!
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an answer as to what would happen to the numerous acts already ex-
isting as regulations, some of which would now have to be classifi ed as 
laws, and others as regulations of the new Constitutional Treaty type. At 
the same time, some current directives would also have to be renamed 
as regulations. 
In summary, the Reform Treaty’s choice to retain the old names of 
legal acts is simpler. It is merely regrettable that one sound innovation of 
the Constitutional Treaty - namely, adding the attribute ‘European’ to the 
names of EU legal acts - has not been retained in the Reform Treaty.
Division into legislative/non-legislative acts, implied hierarchy and 
separation of powers
Both the Constitutional Treaty and the Reform Treaty have elected 
to make things more understandable to citizens by dividing legal acts ac-
cording to the separation of powers among the institutions of government 
existing in European states. These acts were thus divided into legislative 
and non-legislative acts, thereby connecting them to the familiar notions 
of legislative and executive power. Legislative power in European states 
is associated with parliaments, and executive power with governments; 
and European models of the separation of powers have an in-built hier-
archy in which the parliament is superordinated to the executive power, 
as the latter only executes the will of the former. In the Member States, 
the hierarchy of legislative acts (superior) and executive/non-legislative 
acts (inferior) is coupled with a hierarchy among the institutions enact-
ing them, ie the parliament (superior) and the executive branch (inferior). 
The division of EU acts into legislative and non-legislative ones, therefore, 
necessarily has the consequence of creating the perception of a hierarchy 
not only among EU acts but also among EU institutions.75 
However, the European Union system does not seem to be based 
on such a separation of powers. As already explained, there is no pre-
designed distribution of legislative functions to some institutions and 
executive functions to others. In fact, it is diffi cult to say which institu-
tions in the EU are executive ones.76 Consequently, there is no pre-de-
signed hierarchy among European institutions, either. As one author has 
stated, the EU system as it now stands is a system of functional checks 
and balances, rather than one relying on a single hierarchical chain that 
75  Neither the Constitutional Treaty nor the Reform Treaty have, however, explicitly created 
a hierarchy among the enumerated acts.
76  See eg Deirdre Curtin, ‘Mind the Gap: The Evolving EU Executive and the Constitution’, 
3rd Walter Van Gerven Lecture (Leuven CCLE, 2004) <http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/
ccle/pdf/wvg3.pdf> accessed 3 August 2007.
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guarantees its democratic legitimacy.77 So attaching a higher rank in the 
hierarchy to acts emanating from certain institutions, simply because 
they emanate from these institutions, will lead European citizens to mis-
takenly assume that some institutions of the EU are superior to others. 
Therefore, in terms of simplifi cation, the implied hierarchy among legal 
acts does not serve to bring the legal text in line with reality, as the reality 
is not hierarchical.
On the other hand, such a hierarchisation of acts may serve to ac-
tually bring about a clearer separation of powers and hierarchy among 
institutions. If this is so, the new organisation of legal acts would merely 
refl ect the newly agreed separation of powers among institutions. And 
so the real reason behind this new organisation of acts might actually 
be to create a balance of powers on the EU level, similar to that existing 
in the Member States. If considered in terms of simplifi cation, this could 
be justifi ed by the fact that citizens are familiar with national systems of 
the separation of powers, and that creating the same or a similar system 
in the EU will help citizens understand the EU. In other words, if the 
EU model could be organised so that the European Parliament and the 
Council were perceived as legislators, and the Commission as the execu-
tive, citizens would understand it. 
The link between the hierarchisation of acts and the creation of a 
hierarchy among institutions cannot be denied. Speaking as an expert for 
the Working Group on Simplifi cation, Jean Claude-Piris explained that 
‘the customary distinction between legislative and executive authority, 
ie between some institutions empowered only to pass laws and others 
merely implementing legislation or issuing regulations’ can only with dif-
fi culty be transposed to the Union without upsetting the existing balance 
between institutions.78 Therefore, reading the provisions relating to legal 
acts as refl ecting a new type of relationship between EU institutions, 
based on some general principle distributing powers among them, would 
only be possible if such a new institutional balance were the result of a 
political agreement.
Leaving aside the fact that such oversimplifi cation of functions is 
not possible (not only in the EU, but also in the Member States) and the 
discussion as to whether this would be appropriate for the Union at all, 
it will suffi ce here to note that such a political deal concerning a different 
distribution of powers among institutions does not seem to have been 
reached either at the 2004 IGC leading to the Constitutional Treaty or at 
the Brussels European Council which created the mandate for the cur-
77  B Crum, ‘Legislative-Executive Relations in the EU’ [2003] 41 JCMS 375, 380.
78  European Convention (Secretariat), ‘Note summarising the meeting of Working Group IX 
(Simplifi cation) on 17 October 2002’ CONV 363/02 (Brussels, 22 October 2002) 8.
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rent IGC. In both the Constitutional Treaty and the Reform Treaty, EU 
institutions are still described in terms of their various functions,79 while 
their specifi c powers depend on the legal basis in a given policy area, 
which is to be found elsewhere in the Treaties.80 It is, therefore, impos-
sible to know what the powers of the Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament are without entering into concrete policy areas and 
the Treaty provisions regulating them. As Lenaerts and Desomer have 
said, ‘the Court’s ruling in France, Italy and the United Kingdom v Com-
mission, denying the Union a general principle of separation of powers, 
still stands under the Constitution’.81 Although made in relation to the 
Constitutional Treaty, the authors would probably repeat this statement 
with regard to the Reform Treaty, as there are no signifi cant differences 
between the two in terms of institutional provisions. One cannot locate 
any one general principle delimiting powers among institutions. Rather, 
the relationship and balance of powers between institutions still depends 
on the specifi c area of EU competence, and can be understood only by 
reading the relevant provisions of the Treaties. It does not seem, there-
fore, that the implied general hierarchy among legal acts can be explained 
by the desire to reorganise the EU’s institutional structure of powers, and 
thus simplify things for EU citizens by making the separation of powers 
more similar to familiar divisions in the national setting. 
The third possible reading of the division of acts into legislative and 
non-legislative ones could be that it only clarifi es what is already the 
reality in the EU: namely, that there do indeed exist several levels of EU 
rule-making, and that there is a hierarchy among these levels.82 Legisla-
tive acts are thus the enabling acts, while non-legislative acts are always 
adopted on the basis of such acts, and so require the enabling provi-
79  The European Parliament and the Council are described as having legislative functions, 
among others. See, respectively, Art 9a and 9c TEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty.
80  Hence the reference to other parts of the Treaties in the general opening articles on 
institutions. Pursuant to the Treaties, the European Parliament, for example, exercises 
functions of political control and consultation (Art 9a para 1 TEU, as proposed by Art 1 
- 15) of the Reform Treaty); the Council carries out policy-making and coordinating func-
tions (Art 9c para 1 TEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty); and the Commission exercises 
coordinating, executive and management functions (Art 9d para 1 TEU, as proposed by the 
Reform Treaty). 
81  K Lenaerts and M Desomer, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? 
Simplifi cation of Legal Instruments and Procedures’ [2005] 11 ELJ 744, 764. 
82  One successful example of using decision-making at several levels, and thus allowing 
for more technical decisions to be enacted into law by a simpler decision-making process, 
is the Lamfalussy Project on regulation of the EU Securities Market. In this respect, see EC 
Commission, ‘Staff Working Document on the Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU 
Securities Markets Legislation’ SEC (2004) 1459, 15 November 2004. This project is already 
being implemented under the present constitutional framework of the EC Treaty, thus prov-
ing that decision-making by hierarchical levels does not necessitate Treaty changes, but 
only the political will of the institutions.
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sions in what are now called legislative acts. This does not change the 
reality, as the principle that an act adopted on the basis of another act 
must be in conformity with the latter in order to be legally valid already 
exists in the EU.83 Likewise, current case law already reserves the es-
sential elements of an area for decisions by the institution(s) and under 
the procedures required by the relevant legal bases in the Treaties.84 The 
real question, then, is only whether the institution adopting the basic 
act has such a power under the Treaties, and whether the institution 
adopting the implementing act has such a power under the basic act, or 
else has exceeded the powers so granted. As acts adopted based on del-
egated powers need an enabling legislative act, and acts adopted based 
on implementing powers need an enabling legislative or delegated act, the 
implied hierarchy among acts in the new Treaty can be read simply as 
explicitly stating an already existing principle of EU law. The hierarchy 
thus introduced is, again, only a relational one, and there is nothing in 
the proposed text that would allow the reading of any hierarchy among 
non-legislative and legislative acts. Understood in this way, the articles 
on legal acts might have some simplifying effects, as they offer, in the text 
of the Treaties themselves, a judicially developed rule on relational hier-
archy as one of the expressions of the principle of legality. 
Legislative versus non-legislative acts and democratic legitimacy 
As explained earlier, both the Constitutional Treaty and the Reform 
Treaty defi ne legislative acts in a formal way, namely, as acts adopted in 
legislative procedure. This in and of itself does not clarify anything for 
European citizens, who are likely to ask: ‘And - so what?’ Since this defi -
nition lacks any substantive explanation that might distinguish legisla-
tive acts from other types of legal acts, and thus explain the purpose of 
this distinction, it is entirely superfl uous, if not also confusing. 
On the other hand, attaching to certain acts, and to them only, the 
quality of legislative acts must have some meaning, and must be meant 
to protect citizens’ interests in a certain way. The answer is possibly hid-
den in the new Article 249b ToFEU, which relates not to legislative acts 
but to non-legislative delegated acts. The Article states that the essential 
elements of an area are to be reserved for legislative acts, and cannot be 
delegated. Such a substantive defi nition of a legislative act was proposed 
by the Convention’s Working Group on Simplifi cation.85 In an article pub-
83  See n 16.
84  See Case 25/70 Köster (n 17).
85  According to the fi nal proposal by the Working Group on Simplifi cation, a legislative act 
was to be ‘adopted on the basis of the Treaty and containing essential elements in a given 
fi eld’; Working Group IX on Simplifi cation (n 6) 9.
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lished after the Constitutional Treaty was signed at the IGC, Lenaerts 
and Desomer explained that the aim of reforming legal instruments un-
der that Treaty was to ‘rationalise the use of procedures and instruments 
in an increasingly political Union so that the basic policy choices in the 
EU legal order are taken according to the democratically most legitimate 
decision-making procedure’.86
Of the existing procedures available, the co-decision procedure is 
the democratically most legitimate one, as only it gives the European 
Parliament a real decision-making power (even if this is still limited by 
the equal power of the Council). As the Parliament is the only body that 
can be controlled directly by European citizens, it is commonly held that 
democracy in EU decision-making can be increased by enlarging the de-
cision-making powers of that body. In this way, the requirement for dem-
ocratic legitimacy in a formal model of democracy is satisfi ed. If an act is 
adopted in a procedure which is deemed democratically legitimate, that 
act’s legitimacy follows automatically. The form of adoption ensures the 
legitimacy of the act. Thus connecting the act with the adoption proce-
dure increases the input legitimacy of EU legal acts. 
The necessity for enhanced input legitimacy in the EU has been rec-
ognised in political theory.87 Stated in simple terms, the argument is that 
a polity is deemed legitimate if based on both input88 and output89 legiti-
macy. In different political systems, a different balance may be achieved 
between these two, but both need to be present. The legitimacy of current 
EU decision-making is usually explained only in terms of output legiti-
macy, ie citizens’ approval of the outcome of the decision-making process 
is what has legitimised EU institutions. Such output legitimacy is sub-
stance- or results-based. It does not matter, therefore, whether it was the 
Council, the Parliament or the Commission which adopted an act, nor 
86  Lenaerts and Desomer (n 81) 750. Democratic legitimacy was also a concern of the 
Working Group on Simplifi cation, which stated that its task was ‘not only to make more 
comprehensible, but also to provide a guarantee that acts with the same legal/political 
force have the same foundation in terms of democratic legitimacy’; Working Group IX on 
Simplifi cation (n 6) 2.
87  B Rittberger, ‘Democracy and Accountability in the Enlarged European Union - The 
Development of European Parliament’s Powers’ <http://www.swp.berlin.org/common/
get_document.php?asset_id=830> accessed 3 September 2007. See also M Höreth, ‘The 
Trilemma of Legitimacy - Multilevel Governance in the EU and the Problem of Democracy’ 
(1998) ZEI Discussion Paper C 11 <http://aei.pitt.edu/340/> accessed 3 September 2007; 
and Heidrun Abromeit and Sebastian Wolf, ‘Will the Constitutional Treaty Contribute to the 
Legitimacy of the European Union’? (2005) 9(11) EIoP <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-
011a.htm> accessed 3 September 2007.
88  Input legitimacy is achieved if decisions are made in a democratic process. It depends on 
the way in which decisions are made, not on the results which these decisions produce. 
89  Output legitimacy is achieved if decisions solve citizens’ problems effectively. It depends, 
therefore, on the results which these decisions produce.
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does it matter which procedure they used; what matters is whether a deci-
sion produces a result that is desirable, or at least acceptable, to citizens. 
On the other hand, the EU’s input or democratic legitimacy is considered 
weak, as the usual modes of ensuring such legitimacy - popular interests 
represented in a national parliament, the democratic accountability of 
MPs - has been circumvented by the Member States’ loss of control over 
EU decision-making.90 At the same time, the European Parliament’s pow-
ers have not been designed so as to replace national parliaments in their 
legitimising roles. The procedure that comes closest to simulating this 
in the European Parliament is co-decision. Therefore, conditioning the 
possibility of enacting the most important decisions on the co-decision 
procedure increases input or democratic legitimacy, which is weak in the 
EU as compared to the Member States. 
By coupling the most important decisions with the most democratic 
form of decision-making, the reorganisation of legal acts could possibly 
contribute to the EU’s input legitimacy. However, if this is the aim of 
separating legislative from non-legislative acts, why is this not stated in 
the text of the Reform Treaty? Why do citizens need to read the article on 
delegated acts in order to understand that calling an act ‘legislative’ and 
defi ning it in terms of its adoption procedure are meant to ensure that 
the most important choices are adopted in a procedure over which they 
have the most infl uence? If the division into legislative and non-legislative 
acts really will increase the input legitimacy of EU decisions, it cannot be 
said that this will result from the simplicity with which it is explained to 
citizens in the new text of the Treaties. 
Additionally, linking the new division of legal instruments to demo-
cratic legitimacy is complicated by the fact that some legislative acts are 
the result of procedures in which the European Parliament does not have 
a decision-making role (ie those for which the Reform Treaty uses the 
common name of ‘special legislative procedures’).91 As explained by Lena-
erts ‘[t]his choice refl ects a rather realist and pragmatic approach which 
tends to suffer from a lack of democratic legitimacy, but which simply 
testifi es to the particular sensitivity of those matters to some, if not all, 
Member States’.92 It is possible to treat special legislative procedures as 
90  Thus some gain in input legitimacy will also be achieved through the involvement of na-
tional parliaments in EU decision-making, as proposed by the Reform Treaty and Protocol 
No 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU.
91  Art 249a para 2 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty. I have found 28 such in-
stances in the text of the ToFEU (errors are possible, given the lack of a consolidated version 
of the Treaty at this point). The Council enacts legislative acts alone in special legislative 
procedure pursuant to the following articles of the ToFEU: 17bis/1; 18/3; 19/1; 19/2; 
20; 22/2; 69/3; 69D/3; 69F/2; 69I; 69J/3; 69L; 72; 93; 95; 97A; 104/14; 105/6; 137/2; 
166/4; 175/2; 176A/3; 187; 229A; 266; 269; 270A/2; 270B.
92  Lenaerts (n 29) 58.
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an expression of political realism, and thus as a (temporary?) exception 
confi rming the basic rule, ie the co-decision procedure for enacting leg-
islative acts. However, this only confi rms that the increased input legiti-
macy of the EU political system is the result not of a generally applicable 
division of acts into legislative and non-legislative ones, but rather of a 
political agreement to submit more areas of EU policy to the co-decision 
procedure. 
One consequence of dividing acts into legislative and non-legislative 
is that the Council will be obliged to make its deliberations more trans-
parent (public and published)93 when deciding on the draft of a legisla-
tive act. This in itself is a welcome novelty, as up till now the Treaties 
did not confi ne the Council to methods of decision-making that enable 
democratic control. Transparency of deliberations is envisaged by the 
Council’s Rules of Procedure,94 yet open meetings are only foreseen in the 
case of draft legal acts adopted in the co-decision procedure.95 After the 
Reform Treaty enters into force, the Council will have to open its meet-
ings when discussing any legislative act, also including those adopted in 
a special legislative procedure. As already mentioned, it is not entirely 
clear whether all acts adopted by the Council alone, directly pursuant to 
the Reform Treaty but involving some participation by the European Par-
liament, represent legislative acts. (The Constitutional Treaty opted for 
some of these acts to be non-legislative.) If this question ever arises before 
the ECJ, it may be expected that the Court will opt for a solution whereby 
all such acts are categorised as legislative, as this would enhance democ-
racy in the EU due to the Council’s newly introduced obligation to hold 
open meetings. On the other hand, the exemption of non-legislative acts 
from the obligation to openness might prompt the Council to grant itself 
implementing powers more often so as to avoid public deliberations. The 
Reform Treaty allows this only in ‘duly justifi ed specifi c cases’. However, 
given the vagueness of that phrase and the unclear difference between 
legislative and non-legislative acts, which it is left to the legislator to 
decide, such attempts cannot be excluded. This is particularly likely in 
areas that still escape co-decision, since the European Parliament will 
not have a vote. At the same time, the very reason why the Parliament is 
excluded is due to the sensitivity of these areas for the Member States.96 
93  In this respect, see Art 9C/8 TEU and Art 21a ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform 
Treaty.
94  Council Decision 2004/338/EC, Euratom of 22 March 2004 [2004] OJ L106/22.
95  Ibid Art 8. 
96  For example, Art 18 para 3 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty, provides only for 
consultation with the European Parliament on the adoption of measures concerning social 
security and social protection which are necessary in order to attain the free movement of 
EU citizens. 
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This may also be a reason for the Council to seek to discuss such issues 
secretly. 
Linking the notion of legislation to the most important policy choices 
(or essential elements of an area, to use the Treaty’s terminology) opens 
two additional questions. First of all, does this mean that other, less im-
portant issues may not be decided by legislative acts? Or, to put it differ-
ently, is the legislator limited by such a defi nition and forced to delegate 
less important issues to different processes and institutions? The present 
wording of the Treaty does not suggest this. Since everything but essen-
tial elements of a policy area ‘may’ be delegated to the Commission, this 
can be read to mean that anything may, fi rst of all, be decided by legis-
lative acts, that is, in legislative procedure.97 The choice of what should 
be delegated is to be made in the legislative process. While the legislator 
should exercise some self-discipline and not enter into too much detail 
in making legislation, it does not seem that binding him legally to con-
centrate only on essential elements is either useful or, indeed, verifi able 
in practice.98 
The second question that remains unanswered is: which elements 
are essential?99 Obviously, this is not a question that can be answered 
generally and in advance for all policy areas in the EU’s competence. 
Rather, it should be decided on a case-by-case basis. That said, one im-
portant issue remains open: namely, who is to decide what is essential 
and what is not? Obviously, it is the legislative process and its actors that 
can answer this question on each occasion.100 It is important to ask, how-
ever, whether their choice can be reviewed by the Court. Is the substan-
tive part of the defi nition of a legislative act justiciable? In other words, 
can one submit to the Court the issue of whether the power to decide on 
an essential question has been delegated contrary to the Treaty, if deter-
mining what is essential depends on the political process itself? 
97  ‘Anything’ is, of course limited in the fi rst place by the principle of conferral, and in the 
second place by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
98  But see Lenaerts, who argues that legislative acts should be ‘confi ned’ to basic policy 
options (European Convention (n 78) 3). Indeed, some legal systems do limit the legislative 
function on a substantive basis. Thus, for example, Article 34 of the French Constitution 
enumerates what may be regulated by a law (loi). All other issues are left to the executive 
(according to Art 37 of the French Constitution: ‘Les matières autres que celles qui sont 
du domaine de la loi ont un caractère réglementaire’). In this respect, see CM Alves, ‘La 
hiérarchie du droit dérivé unilatéral à la lumière de la Constitution européenne: révolution 
ou sacrifi ce au nominalisme?’ [2004] 5-6 CDE 691, who does not suggest transplanting the 
French model to the EU.
99  In this respect, see also Dougan (n 29) 784-785 and Hofmann (n 73) 10.
100  For the same opinion, see the Final Report of Working Group IX on Simplifi cation (n 
6) 10. The Working Group considered that the scope of essential elements or fundamental 
policy choices should be determined by the legislator on a case-by-case basis. 
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In its existing practice, the ECJ has proved willing to judge what is 
and what is not essential.101 It has not, however, developed some gen-
eral criteria according to which it decides such issues. Although in Case 
C-240/90 Germany v Commission it stated that determining what is es-
sential ‘must be reserved for provisions which are intended to give con-
crete shape to the fundamental guidelines of Community policy’,102 this 
statement is so abstract that one still cannot predict in advance which 
issues the Court will consider essential, and which not. It might be ex-
pected, however, that the Court, in accordance with the recent trend of 
deferring more to the political process,103 will choose a less intensive type 
of scrutiny and, for example, review only the formal side of such a deci-
sion, ie did the political institutions consider whether the delegated issue 
was essential at all? If so, the Court might choose not to enter into the 
substance of the issue, but simply trust that the political process is more 
suitable for fi nding adequate answers. 
If the division into legislative and non-legislative acts does not cre-
ate a hierarchy among legal acts, at least not an absolute one; if it does 
not reorganise, or result from the reorganisation of, the balance of pow-
ers among EU institutions; and if it does not in itself increase the level 
of democracy in the Union’s decision-making process, citizens may then 
justifi ably ask why it is in the Treaty at all.
Delegated versus implementing acts 
Another puzzling division is that between non-legislative delegated 
and non-legislative implementing acts. The Reform Treaty (as the Consti-
tutional Treaty before it) does not explain where the difference lies. Article 
249b ToFEU, which deals with delegated acts, states the following:
1. A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to 
adopt non-legislative acts to supplement or amend certain non-es-
sential elements of the legislative act. The objectives, content, scope 
and duration of the delegation of power shall be explicitly defi ned 
in the legislative acts. The essential elements of an area shall be re-
served for the legislative act and accordingly shall not be the subject 
of a delegation of power.
The one thing that is clear is that delegation can happen only on the 
basis of a legislative act, which means that only the European Parliament 
101  See eg Case 25/70 Köster (n 17) and Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR 
I-5383. See also Case C-156/93 European Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019.
102  Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission (n 101) para 37.
103  Case C-112/00 Schmidberger Internationale Transporte Planzuge v Austria [2003] ECR 
I-5659.
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and the Council, together or separately, can delegate. It is also clear that 
they can delegate only to the Commission. The rest is uncertain. One such 
uncertainty concerns the status of acts adopted directly pursuant to the 
Treaties by the Council or the Parliament alone. If these are legislative 
acts, they may delegate to the Commission; otherwise, they may not. 
The proclaimed purpose of delegation is to enable the Commission 
to ‘supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative 
act’. At the same time, the essential elements of an area cannot be del-
egated, but are reserved to legislation. The Commission can thus amend 
only the non-essential elements of an enabling legislative act. Nonethe-
less, in doing so the Commission will have to make complex policy choic-
es, thus exercising a substantive power equivalent to legislative power. 
In this respect, it is not entirely clear why delegated acts are considered 
non-legislative rather than legislative acts. Likewise, the word ‘delegat-
ed’ suggests that the power transferred to the Commission is the same 
power which the ‘legislator’ possesses. Thus the Commission’s power to 
amend non-essential elements of a legislative act is essentially a legisla-
tive power.104 The only difference is that the Commission cannot make 
policy choices concerning the ‘essential elements’ of a policy area.
Amending is one part of the defi nition of delegation; the other is 
‘supplementing’ a legislative act. To supplement is obviously something 
different than to amend. Therefore, it must mean adding something to the 
existing provisions without changing anything in them. But what exactly 
can the Commission supplement? Is the power to supplement confi ned 
to non-essential elements of the legislative act, as might be concluded 
from the text of the provision, or can the Commission supplement both 
‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ parts of the enabling act? If supplementing 
means not changing, then there is no reason why the Commission should 
be prevented from also supplementing the ‘essential’ parts of the enabling 
act (provided that such a decision itself is not deemed ‘essential’).
However, if supplementing the basic act is a power the Commission 
acquires through delegation, what then is implementation all about? Ac-
cording to paragraph 2 of Article 249c ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform 
Treaty:
Where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union 
acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on 
the Commission, or, in duly justifi ed specifi c cases and in the cases 
provided for in Article [I-40], on the Council.
104  In this respect, Craig argues that ‘delegated regulations are only non-legislative in the 
formal sense that they are not primary laws. This does not mean that they are not legislative 
in nature.’; see P Craig ‘The Constitutional Treaty: Legislative and Executive Power in the 
Emerging Constitutional Order’ (2004) EUI-LAW Working Paper 7 p 32.
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There are two possible readings here. The fi rst and less likely one is 
that implementation only means applying legal rules to individual situ-
ations. The only act appropriate for individual decisions is a decision as 
defi ned in Article 249 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty. How-
ever, Article 249c, which deals with implementation, does not state that 
only implementing decisions may be adopted. Furthermore, the Consti-
tutional Treaty, upon which the Reform Treaty is largely based, made it 
clear that acts of general application may also be adopted for purposes of 
implementation, and provided for the adoption of implementing regula-
tions. This, together with the wording of the provision conditioning EU 
implementing powers on the necessity of assuring uniform conditions, 
calls for a different reading: implementation is not only about applying 
rules to individual situations, but also about supplementing basic rules 
by adopting additional general rules. The difference between such an ac-
tivity and the supplementing of basic rules under delegation is beyond 
my power of discernment. Therefore, I can only conclude that delegation 
and implementation are the same activity, at least in part. 
The notion of delegation is new to the EU legal order. Unlike imple-
mentation, it was proposed for the fi rst time in the Constitutional Treaty. 
This does not mean that the Commission has not exercised delegated 
powers before now. Rather, both kinds of powers were called implemen-
tation; and implementation was performed on the basis of delegation, ie 
a delegating act specifying how the Commission could use the delegated 
powers. For although the Commission is often described as the EU execu-
tive, it does not enjoy any general implementing powers of its own. Rather, 
it only has specifi c powers of decision-making based directly on the Trea-
ties, or the powers delegated to it by acts adopted by the Council alone or 
the Council and the Parliament together. The latter are based on Article 
202 (third indent) TEC, which was introduced into the EC Treaty by the 
Single European Act. This provision contains a general rule granting the 
Council the power to delegate implementing powers to the Commission, 
and stating that the Council confers on the Commission powers to imple-
ment the rules it lays down. Since, in the course of time, the European 
Parliament has become a co-legislator in certain policy areas, the Council 
and the Parliament have sometimes jointly delegated powers of implemen-
tation to the Commission. Pursuant to Article 202 TEC, the Commission 
has often been empowered to enact rules of a general nature.105
105  In the area of competition policy, for example, the Commission has adopted several 
regulations on block exemptions based on Council Regulation 17/62 [1959-1962] OJ L87, 
replaced by Council Regulation 1/2003 [2003] OJ L1/1. These are Commission Regulation 
2790/1999 on vertical agreements [1999] OJ L336/21; Commission Regulation 2658/2000 
on specialisation agreements [2000] OJ L304/3; Commission Regulation 2659/2000 on 
research and development agreements [2000] OJ L304/7; and Commission Regulation 
772/2004 on technology transfer agreements [2004] OJ L123/18.
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Together with providing for the legislator’s general power to delegate 
powers to the Commission, Article 202 (third indent) also envisages that 
such delegated power may be controlled by the delegating body based 
on general rules enacted in advance. These general rules enacted by the 
Council have become known as the Comitology Decision.106 These pro-
vide for three types of committees that are engaged with the Commission 
during decision-making, representing the Member States on an expert 
level and infl uencing the Commission’s fi nal decision. The committee 
management and regulatory procedures call for a planned implementing 
measure to be returned for decision by the Council should the commit-
tee vote against it (management procedure),107 or not vote for it (regula-
tory procedure).108 Two EU institutions have indicated their dislike of the 
comitology procedure: the Commission, because it limited its implement-
ing powers, especially in the form of the regulatory committee procedure, 
and the European Parliament, because it has largely been excluded from 
controlling the Commission’s implementing powers, even if it has gained 
real powers of co-decision with the Council in the meantime.109 One ad-
ditional objection to comitology is its non-transparent and, therefore, un-
democratic nature,110 which hides from the public what really goes on in 
the decision-making process, as the minutes of committee meetings are 
not made public in any way. 
The new provision on delegated acts should probably be viewed in this 
light. The second paragraph of Article 249b ToFEU proposes different con-
trol mechanisms over the Commission when exercising delegated powers: 
Legislative acts shall explicitly lay down the conditions to which the 
delegation is subject; these conditions may be as follows: 
(a)  the European Parliament or the Council may decide to revoke the 
delegation; 
(b) the delegated act may enter into force only if no objection has 
been expressed by the European Parliament or the Council with-
in a period set by the legislative act.
106  The fi rst Comitology Decision was adopted in 1987 as Decision 87/373 OJ L197/33. 
It was replaced in 1999 by the Second Comitology Decision, ie Decision 1999/468 OJ 
L184/23 (n 13). 
107  Art 4 of the Second Comitology Decision (n 13).
108  Art 5 of the Second Comitology Decision (n 13).
109  The Second Comitology Decision increased Parliament’s powers in comitology by in-
cluding the obligation to inform Parliament when the Commission transfers a proposal to 
the Council, and by allowing it to adopt a resolution when a draft implementing act exceeds 
the delegated mandate, if a measure was submitted to a committee based on an enabling 
act adopted in a co-decision procedure. 
110  See eg R Dehousse, ‘Misfi ts: EU Law and the Transformation of European Govern-
ance’ (2002) Jean Monnet Working Paper 2 <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/pa-
pers/02/020201.html> accessed 3 August 2007.
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Delegation and implementation thus do not differ substantively, at 
least not in the sense of enabling the Commission to enact provisions of a 
general nature in order to supplement the basic act. The two differ in the 
way in which the delegating body (or bodies) can control the Commission’s 
exercise of the delegated powers. While comitology enables control of the 
Commission throughout the process leading to a fi nal decision, the new 
control mechanisms for delegated powers provide only for ex post control. 
They leave more freedom to the Commission, and their effi ciency as con-
trol mechanisms may prove less then the existing comitology model.111 If 
delegation is necessary in today’s world of rapid changes and technologi-
cal developments, since it allows quicker regulatory adjustments to real 
world demands, the reason why the institution primarily responsible for 
legislating will maintain control over such delegation is democracy. It is 
thus puzzling why that form of delegation closest to legislation is submit-
ted to less democratic control than a form involving fewer policy choices, 
ie implementation. It seems that separating delegation from implementa-
tion represents a victory for the Commission in trying to establish itself 
as a self-standing EU executive.112 
If this new model of control proves ineffective, it will not satisfac-
torily fulfi l the European Parliament’s demand for greater control over 
the Commission’s delegated powers. From the Parliament’s perspective, 
the better solution would seem to be keeping the old comitology system, 
which could then be adjusted to give more powers of control to the Par-
liament. This could be ensured by involving the Parliament in the enact-
ment of a general comitology decision, which has indeed been done by the 
new Article 249c ToFEU with regard to implementation.113 
Due to the lack of a substantive difference between delegation and 
implementation, coupled with a signifi cant difference in powers of control 
over the Commission, the number of inter-institutional confl icts might 
increase, causing an additional overload for the European Court of Jus-
tice. The ECJ will then be forced to defi ne the borderline between delega-
tion and implementation. 
111  Craig (n 104) 32-33.
112  Bergström considers that the new solution is indeed what the Commission has always 
asked for, but was rejected by the Council; see CF Bergström, Comitology, Delegation of 
Powers in the European Union and the Committee System (OUP, Oxford 2005) 354-355. 
Some scholars had argued in favour of giving, or, as they put it, ‘returning’ more powers to 
the European Commission through the IGC leading to the Constitutional Treaty. See eg J-P 
Jacqué, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’ [2004] 41 CML Rev 383, 391.
113  Art 249c para 3 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty, envisages that in the future 
comitology-type decisions will be enacted together by the Parliament and the Council in 
ordinary legislative procedure. This article does not require in any way that the comitology 
system be retained. 
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There is one more reason, this one of constitutional signifi cance, 
as to why the line between implementation and delegation will have to 
be defi ned. According to the Treaty, the primary responsibility for im-
plementing EU law lies with the Member States, not with Community 
institutions.114 The EU may implement only if ‘uniform conditions for im-
plementing legally binding Union acts are needed’.115 If it is necessary to 
secure uniform conditions of implementation, implementing powers may 
be conferred on the Commission or, only exceptionally, on the Council (in 
duly justifi ed specifi c cases, to use the Treaty’s words). By empowering 
the Commission (or the Council) to implement, the body granting such 
power116 essentially deprives the Member States of their original power. 
Thus the question of the vertical (federal) division of powers between the 
EU and its Member States becomes relevant in the case of implementa-
tion. This is not the case with delegation, since by delegating their own 
legislative powers to the Commission, the Council and the Parliament 
are not depriving the Member States of their powers, but rather only del-
egating powers which already exist at the European level. The question 
of whether the EU legislator (the Council and the Parliament) possesses 
such legislative powers to be delegated is answered by the principles of 
conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality. Once it is clear that the EU 
has the power to decide on certain issues, the institution(s) to which such 
power belongs under the Treaty may delegate it to the Commission. 
There is also one logical inconsistency in this entire construct. Name-
ly, if implementing powers really belong originally to the Member States, 
it should be the Member States which delegate them to the Commission, 
not EU institutions. This may be resolved by saying that, where uniform 
conditions of implementation are needed, implementing powers belong to 
the EU level, and may therefore be exercised by the Commission. 
By deciding that something is delegation, rather than implementa-
tion, EU institutions may, whether intentionally or not, disturb the verti-
cal balance of powers designed by the Treaties. The delimitation between 
implementation and delegation newly introduced by the Constitutional 
Treaty, and taken over by the Reform Treaty, is thus far from simple.
114  The new Art 249c ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty, states in its fi rst paragraph 
that ‘Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to implement legally 
binding Union acts’. 
115  The new Art 249c para 2 ToFEU, as proposed by the Reform Treaty. 
116  It seems that implementing powers may be granted by any type of EU act, ie not only 
by legislative acts. This means that not only the European Parliament and the Council but 
also the Commission itself may grant the Commission implementing powers.
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Conclusion
What was proposed by the Constitutional Treaty, and remains on 
the table under the Reform Treaty, with regard to the legal instruments 
which EU institutions use when they decide on EU policies cannot be 
described as simplifi cation. Neither does it present the existing system of 
EU legal acts in a more user-friendly way, nor has it changed the system 
substantively in a way that is more understandable to EU citizens and 
explained this adequately in the new Treaty.
The biggest novelty is the introduction of the distinction between leg-
islative and non-legislative acts. However, even if such a distinction has 
been nominally introduced, in substantive terms the four relevant articles 
of the ToFEU (Articles 249 - 249c) do nothing more than state what has 
already developed in EU practice. The division between legislative and 
non-legislative acts does not reorganise, or result from a reorganisation 
of, the balance of powers among EU institutions. It does not create a hi-
erarchy among legal acts, at least not an absolute one. Most importantly, 
it does not, at least not in and of itself, increase the level of democracy in 
the European Union’s decision-making process. Democracy will indeed 
increase by submitting more areas of EU policy to co-decision (renamed 
as ‘regular legislative procedure’). However, the division of acts into leg-
islative and non-legislative was not the condition for such an increase in 
the level of democracy. 
This apparently new system is new not in substance but only in 
name, and the name is actually wrong because it is misleading. It is 
misleading primarily because it describes the EU using terminology com-
mon within the Member States’ legal and political systems, whereas the 
organisation of EU decision-making and the legitimisation of its decisions 
do not follow the same model. The Reform Treaty has not changed this. 
The chosen terminology is additionally confusing because some of the 
terms have been used hitherto in EU matters with a different meaning: 
for example, the term ‘legislation’ has simply meant acts of general ap-
plication;117 or, to take another example, the term ‘implementation’ has 
been used to denote what is called both ‘implementation’ and ‘delegation’ 
in the Reform Treaty118 (moreover, the new Treaty does not clearly ex-
plain the difference in substance between these two). It is clear that the 
procedures for monitoring implementation and delegation differ, yet it is 
unclear, at least in terms of democracy, why more freedom is left to the 
Commission under delegated than under implementing powers. 
117  See eg Case 160/88 R Fedessa v Council [1988] ECR 4121 para 27: ‘It has also consist-
ently stated that the criterion for distinguishing between a measure of a legislative nature 
and a decision is whether or not the measure at issue is of general application.’ 
118  Cf Jean-Claude Piris, The Constitution for Europe. A Legal Analysis (CUP, Cambridge 
2006) 73.
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At the same time, the new articles on legal acts have not solved some 
genuine problems which citizens face when confronted with EU acts. This 
refers primarily to the confusing doctrine of the direct or indirect effect of 
directives, which causes uncertainty as to whether citizens do or do not 
have certain rights. Yet as the offspring of judicial practice, it may also 
need to mature in such practice, and not in the political and constitu-
tional process.
There are, however, some simplifi cations in the new Treaty. For ex-
ample, the number of legal acts has been reduced. While this results from 
the reorganisation not of legal acts themselves, but rather of the pillar 
structure, it is still a welcome development. If one compares the Consti-
tutional Treaty with the Reform Treaty in terms of simplicity, the latter 
is better because, if nothing else, it retains the old names for EU legal 
acts. On the other hand, certain useful solutions from the Constitutional 
Treaty have not been transferred to the Reform Treaty, such as adding 
the attribute ‘European’ to the names of EU legal acts.
